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Guidelines available to school administrators to sup-
port school closure decisions during inﬂ  uenza  outbreaks 
are usually not evidence based. Using empirical data on 
absentee rates of elementary school students in Japan, we 
developed a simple and practical algorithm for determining 
the optimal timing of school closures for control of inﬂ  uenza 
outbreaks.
I
nﬂ  uenza pandemic preparedness and seasonal inﬂ  uenza 
control programs have focused on vaccine develop-
ment and antiviral drugs, which are only partially effec-
tive and not always available to all persons at risk (1–3). 
Nonpharmaceutical interventions, such as social distanc-
ing, represent additional key tools for mitigating the impact 
of outbreaks. Because children are a major factor in the 
transmission of inﬂ  uenza within communities and among 
households, school closure may be a valuable social dis-
tancing method (4,5).
Japan has a unique system of monitoring school ab-
senteeism and of instituting school closures during inﬂ  u-
enza outbreaks. Individual classes, speciﬁ  c grade levels, 
or the entire school may be closed; ﬁ  nal decision-making 
authority is given to school principals. However, as in the 
United States and other countries, there are no regulations 
to support these decisions (6). Our study suggests a simple 
system to help determine when schools should be closed; 
daily inﬂ  uenza-related absentee thresholds are measured to 
predict outbreaks.
The Study
We used data on absenteeism caused by inﬂ  uenza from 
the 54 elementary schools in Joetsu City, Niigata Prefecture, 
Japan during the 4 inﬂ  uenza seasons during 2005–2008. 
Data was obtained between the second week of January to 
the third week of March for each inﬂ  uenza season. Average 
school size was 221 students. Current public health policy 
prevents inﬂ  uenza-infected children from attending school 
until 2 days after fever has disappeared. An illness requires 
2 physician visits: 1 for the initial diagnosis and 1 to obtain 
written permission from the treating physician to return to 
school. Diagnoses are usually made by using a rapid anti-
gen test and patients are treated with the antiviral drugs, 
oseltamivir or zanamivir.
 Based on elementary school daily inﬂ  uenza-related 
absentee surveillance, the most intense inﬂ  uenza seasons 
were 2005 and 2007 (Figure 1). The number of schools 
reporting outbreaks during the 4 inﬂ  uenza seasons was 
34 (63%, 2005), 13 (24%, 2006), 35 (65%, 2007) and 18 
(33%, 2008), respectively. Rates of absenteeism caused 
by conﬁ  rmed inﬂ  uenza infection in the 54 elementary 
schools in Joetsu City were well correlated with national 
reports of inﬂ  uenza-like illness by 5,000 sentinel physi-
cians, who reported 322, 205, 226, and 142 cumulative 
cases of infection per sentinel in each season (online 
Technical Appendix, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/
content/15/11/1841-Techapp.pdf).
We evaluated the optimal inﬂ  uenza-related absentee 
rate for predicting outbreaks of inﬂ  uenza. For this study, 
we deﬁ  ned an inﬂ  uenza outbreak in a school as a daily in-
ﬂ  uenza-related absentee rate of >10%, on the basis of the 
95th percentile of daily absentee rates (10.7%) in 54 el-
ementary schools during 4 inﬂ  uenza seasons (online Tech-
nical Appendix).
 Next, we considered 9 different daily inﬂ  uenza-relat-
ed absentee threshold levels for initiating early school clo-
sures: 1%, 2%, 3%, … , 9%. In addition, for each threshold 
level, we considered 3 scenarios: 1) a single-day scenario, 
in which daily inﬂ  uenza-related absentee rates are observed 
for the ﬁ  rst time above a given threshold for 1 day; 2) a 
double-day scenario, in which rates reached a given thresh-
old for the ﬁ  rst time for 2 consecutive days; the rate for 
the second day was the same or higher than for the ﬁ  rst 
day; and 3) a triple-day scenario, in which rates reached 
a given threshold for the ﬁ  rst time for 3 consecutive days; 
rates for the second and third days were the same or higher 
than the rate for the ﬁ  rst day. The double-day and triple-day 
scenarios did not include weekends. To evaluate the per-
formance of prediction for each threshold, we determined 
the school’s outbreak status in the 7-day period starting on 
the ﬁ  rst day of each scenario (online Technical Appendix) 
JMP7.0.1 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC, USA) was used 
for statistical analysis.
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scenario at all 9 threshold levels, and presented these data 
as a plot in Figure 2. The area under the curve for the sin-
gle-, double-, and triple-day scenarios was 0.80 (95% con-
ﬁ  dence interval [CI] 0.77–0.83), 0.85 (95% CI 0.82–0.89) 
and 0.87 (95% CI 0.83–0.91), respectively.
We used the Youden index for calculating optimal 
thresholds (7). The Youden index = (sensitivity) + (speci-
ﬁ  city) – 1. A perfect test result would have a Youden index 
of 1. For the single-day scenario, the optimal threshold was 
5%, with a sensitivity of 0.77 and speciﬁ  city of 0.73. For 
the double-day scenario, the optimal threshold was 4%, 
with a sensitivity of 0.84 and speciﬁ  city of 0.77. For the 
triple-day scenario, the optimal threshold was 3%, with a 
sensitivity of 0.90 and speciﬁ  city of 0.72. 
Conclusions
We have demonstrated the predictive value of a simple 
and practical detection method for triggering school clo-
sures early after inﬂ  uenza outbreaks. Our analysis suggests 
that a single-day at a threshold inﬂ  uenza-related absentee 
rate of 5%, double-days >4%, or triple-days >3% are op-
timal levels for alerting school administrators to consider 
school closure. The double- and triple-day scenarios per-
formed similarly, and gave better results than the single-
day. Thus, the double-day scenario might be the preferred 
early warning trigger.
Our study had the advantage of reliable empirical data 
on inﬂ   uenza-related absenteeism in schools. Data were 
based on physician and laboratory diagnosis and a strong 
absentee surveillance program. However, there are limita-
tions to our approach. We did not have available vaccina-
tion or medication histories of patients. Also, our results 
are based on data from only 1 city’s school district; valida-
tion in a broader area will be required. Although separate 
analyses may be required for other geographic regions, we 
present a simple approach that can be easily reapplied.
Inﬂ  uenza outbreak detection from surveillance data 
typically relies on relatively complex time series analy-
sis or smoothing (8,9). The noisiness of school surveil-
lance data makes detection of outbreaks difﬁ  cult (10). 
However, complex statistical analyses are not practical to 
use in the context of daily decision-making in schools. 
Despite the limitations of our study, we have presented a 
method that provides a basis for empirical data-supported 
decision-making by school administrators that is intuitive 
and practical.
School closure could be an effective method of social 
distancing, although evidence supporting its effectiveness is 
incomplete. Some studies suggest that though child-to-child 
transmission might decrease, transmission might increase in 
other age groups (11,12). During school closures, children 
may need to forgo participation in external activities that 
could increase contact rates. Additionally, working parents 
staying home to care for their children (13) could result in a 
decrease in household income, causing loss of productivity 
and economic losses (14). Decision-makers will need to con-
sider these factors when considering school closures.
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Figure 1. Four-year surveillance of inﬂ  uenza-related absentee rates 
in 54 elementary schools in Joetsu City and national surveillance 
of inﬂ   uenza-like illness (ILI) reported by sentinel physicians in 
Japan. Data were collected from the second week of January (after 
the winter holiday) to the third week of March (before the spring 
holiday). The average of the daily absentee rates for 54 elementary 
schools during 4 inﬂ   uenza seasons (2005–2008) were 3.29%, 
1.77%, 2.97%, and 1.92%, respectively.
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Figure 2. The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve for 
detection of inﬂ  uenza outbreak by 1%–9% thresholds under single-
day, double-day, triple-day scenarios. ROC space is deﬁ  ned on 
the x axis as speciﬁ  city and on the y axis as sensitivity. The area 
under the curve (AUC) is an indicator of the quality of a model; 
larger AUC values corresponded to better performance. Optimal 
thresholds for the 3 scenarios are *single-day, 5%; †double-day, 
4%; and ‡triple-day, 3%.School Closures and Inﬂ  uenza Outbreaks
During the early days of the outbreak of inﬂ  uenza A 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus, the US Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (Atlanta, GA, USA) released 2 
different recommendations for school dismissal after the 
appearance of the ﬁ  rst suspected case: dismiss for 7 days 
(as of April 26) and then for 14 days (as of May 1). Later, 
to reﬂ  ect new knowledge about the extent of community 
spread and disease severity, the recommendation was re-
vised to advise against school closure unless absentee rates 
interfered with school function (15). The pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 inﬂ  uenza outbreak highlights the need for a ﬂ  exible 
national policy that can be quickly adapted to reﬂ  ect cur-
rent situations. The evidence-based strategy for predicting 
outbreaks based on inﬂ  uenza-related absentee rates that we 
present here provides local administrators, who may need 
to consider school closure, with a simple and practical tool 
to aid in their decisions.
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